A Modest Proposal
President Clinton perjured himself, but a greater crime is that we do not give more of our Presidents the opportunity to do likewise. Clinton was hauled up on a matter utterly trivial to the interests of the Republic. What if we required a President to present his budget, the blueprint of most of the U.S. Government's activities for the forthcoming fiscal year, under oath, including:
- That the economic projections represented the best estimates of his Council of Economic Advisors, some of whom actually have professional reputations to lose, and had not been adjusted upward to make the numbers look better.
- That all changes for the revenue-raising mechanisms the President thought advisable have been included, and if he did not include provisions, for example, to modify the Alternative Minimum Tax, then it was because he opposed doing so, in comparison with maintaining the revenue and spending provisions of his budget as submitted.
- That he faithfully included all likely expenses in his projections, including a modest contingency fund, and if he did not include provision for, as an example, any military activity in Afghanistan and Iraq beyond FY-2007, it was because he believed such activity to be unlikely.
But, in the face of all this honesty, how would we keep the opposition from its own dishonest grandstanding, e.g. over the proposed elimination of the Social Security $255 death benefit.
posted by TStockmann @ 2:39 AM
6 comments
6 Comments:
What if we required a President to present his budget, the blueprint of most of the U.S. Government's activities for the forthcoming fiscal year, under oath,
That would be great if the president was responsible. The first article of the Constitution of the United States of America gives Congress the purview of all fiscal matters. So, it really doesn't matter what the President proposes.
"Doesn't matter" in what sense? It's true that I should have said "budget request", but it does "matter:" the final budget, even in happier times when we have different parties in the executive and legislative branches usually bears a very close resemblance to what the President proposes.
In a practical sense, it would be difficult to put togther a government spending plan without an administration budget (the Exec accounts for the overwhelming majority of the budget minus entitlements) that originates in the executive agencies and departments and is vetted by OMB for some sense or reason - or at least political plausibility - but you're surely right that how much revenue and how it is raised, with the economic forecasts required, could originate with the CBO and the appropriation subcommittees (in the House, as required by the Constitution), which would only mean the President puts his hand on the Bible that this is his organization will require for the rest of the year, to the best of his estimation.
And then Congress will have to figure out how to pay the butcher's bill, for whatever it agrees to provide. Is that what you'd propose? Moving budget-making back into legislature? And perhaps you wouldn't mind look into Article One and the very modest Article Two to see what other legislative perogatives might have been ceded unlawfully by Congress, or usurped by what has often been characterized since early in the 20th Century as The Imperial Presidency?
Be delighted to have a dialogue on this comparatively flame-free subject.
Is that what you'd propose? Moving budget-making back into legislature? And perhaps you wouldn't mind look into Article One and the very modest Article Two to see what other legislative perogatives might have been ceded unlawfully by Congress, or usurped by what has often been characterized since early in the 20th Century as The Imperial Presidency?
Yes, that is exactly what I'd propose. The Legislative Branch has ceded a great deal of power to both the Judicial and Executive branches.
Contrary to popular opinion, the three branches of government were not created equally. Likewise, as you pointed out, the House has the power over the Senate to raise revenue (i.e., the two components of the Legislative branch are unequal, though there truly are checks and balances in Congress to keep a relative balance there). The legislative branch was created to be the strongest branch. As evidence, I would point out that Congress is the only branch that is constitutionally authorized to raise funds, raise armies, declare war and draft legislation. The Constitution gives them the right to pass legislation that they can specifically remove from the purview of the Supreme Court. They can also over-ride a veto, making the approval of the Executive unnecessary. Even aside from the ceding of power though, the Congress will never again be a force as long as partisanship rules the day. It's a shame.
In summary, I am all for the Legislative Branch of our government taking back their constitutionally given powers.
Very good points. The legislative branch was indeed designed as the most powerful and the unelected judicial. I'd also add: only Congress has the power to suspend habeus corpus (and only in the event of invasion or rebellion, not war); Congress has the power to remove the elected President, any member of the Supreme Court and, for that matter, its own members for violating the law.
But where is the specific language for: The Constitution gives them the right to pass legislation that they can specifically remove from the purview of the Supreme Court.
Second point: partisanship - even "faction" is inevitable in a multi-member political body. While I'm eager to rein in an overweening executive; I'm not eager to augment the power of a clearly irresponsible body, especially with the federal/state balance out of whack and the protection of the rights that remain with the people so feeble. One point about Marbury vs. Madisan is that absent judicial review of (demogogic) egislative action, the rights guaranteed (and more important the absence of powers enumerated) in the Constitution become, in the immortal words of the Pirates of the Caribbean: "Hang the Code! They're more like guidelines anyway."
You asked, "But where is the specific language for: The Constitution gives them the right to pass legislation that they can specifically remove from the purview of the Supreme Court."
From Article III, Section 2: In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. (Emphasis mine)
The first part of that paragraph lays out powers that Congress cannot control. The rest, as I read it, can be removed from the purview of the Supreme Court. This means that it can be relegated to another, lesser court. I believe it can be extended such that the 'matter' is removed from judicial review entirely. Were such a thing to happen, it would be momentous. Most likely, it would have to survive a 2/3 majority in both the House and Senate. Depending on the law, there would be an uproar, I'm sure. Still, I believe that Congress has this power.
You make a good argument in your Second Point. Surely you know that I'm not a fan of the outcome of Marbury v. Madison. I think we've had this discussion before. : )
rem: I'm not a Constitutional scholar, but I think you're misreading that section. The full stop period ends the enumeration of the cases for which SCOTUS has the original jursidiction. The next sentence stipulates that other cases are appellate to the SCOTUS, with exceptions as made by Congress. The implication in my eyes is that Congress can assign original jusrisdiction to SCOTUS for laws, not that it can bypass judicial review entirely. Further, your suggestion of supermajorities indicates you're not entirely confident: when 2/3's applies to voting procedures, it is stipulated in the Consitution, or set up by the rules of the body itself.
I remember your disagreement over Marbury, but would like to hear your Consitutional alternative to judicial review.
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